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THE LAW OF TAKING ELSEWHERE AND, ONE
SUSPECTS, IN MAINE
Orlando E. Delogu*
If emerging national trends with respect to taking law, including the ratio-
nale and principles underlying these trends, are ignored, we may not like the
consequences.
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate as to the meaning of the Taking Clause in the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution seems unending. This short, almost cryptic consti-
tutional provision, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation," 1 has over the years given rise to both court challenges and philo-
sophic debate aimed at parsing out the meaning and parameters of this language. 2
As the need for regulatory controls (imposed by every level of government) has
increased, 3 the number of challenges and the stridency of the debate has also in-
creased. Moreover, these challenges have increasingly found their way to the United
States Supreme Court.4
* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; B.S., 1960, University of Utah;
M.S., 1963, J.D., 1966, University of Wisconsin.
1. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
2. Some of the earliest cases include Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362
(1894) (sustaining the state's power to impose reasonable railroad rates against a taking chal-
lenge, but striking down the rates immediately before it); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922) (recognizing the legitimacy of regulation, defining a regulatory taking, and
striking down the subsidence control immediately before the court); Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (sustaining zoning ordinance against a taking challenge and recogniz-
ing the need for police power regulations and that such regulations might impinge on property
rights). See also, RicHARM A. EPsTEN, TmaNGS: PmVAm PRoPrm EI D im PowER OF EMmNrT
DoMAni (1985) [hereinafter EPsTEIN, TmuNus]; Institute of Bill of Rights Law Symposium Defin.
ing Takings: Private Property and the Future of Government Regulation, 38 WM. & MARY L.
Rav. 749-1195 (1997); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9
CANADLN J.L. & Jumis. 161 (1996); Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the
Takings Puzzle, 19 HAR. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent
and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 1; John A. Humbach, Economic Due Process and the
Takings Clause, 24 PACE Ervri- L. Rav. 311 (1987); Charles L. Siemon, Of Regulatory Takings
and Other Myths, 1 J. LAND UsE & ENvr.L L. 105 (1985); John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory
for the Just Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 Rurmoss L. REV. 243
(1982); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
3. Environmental and land use controls which existed to some extent prior to 1970 were
expanded significantly during the 1970s and 1980s. These controls were perceived as neces-
sary, in many cases long overdue, and for the most part continue today. They protect many
aspects of the public's health, safety, and general welfare. Most, when challenged, have been
sustained. But these controls do impinge to a greater degree than was historically the case on
private landowner prerogatives. It is this higher degree of interference with traditional private
property rights that has (in recent years) fueled the increasing debate and much of the case law
that would parse out the meaning of the Constitution's Taking Clause.
4. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999)
(sustaining holding below that repeated denials of development proposals that seemingly met all
existing state and local laws constitutes a regulatory taking); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994) (holding that even when "nexus" is found a regulation to be valid must also be
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Originally, this clause was only applied to a physical taking by government,
but this obvious and literal meaning of the clause was at an early date deemed to be
a too narrow view of the Taking Clause and is today regarded as revisionist in its
approach. 5 Over one hundred years ago the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized that police power regulations may also, if too extreme, give rise to a Fifth
Amendment taking, a constructive taking, of the regulated property. That is the
clear holding of Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. 6 and the landmark case,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court (dealing with
state legislation that regulated the mining of coal in order to prevent the subsid-
ence of surface lands) stated that, "I]f regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking.' 8 Since Pennsylvania Coal this so-called regulatory taking strand of
taking jurisprudence has been confirmed time and again by the United States Su-
preme Court9 and (notwithstanding the views of some scholars)lO has been as-
"proportional"-that is, the burden imposed on a landowner must be commensurate with the
harm his development will give rise to); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992) (holding that a regulation that reduces the value of land to zero constitutes a regu-
latory taking); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that for a
regulation to be valid, there must be a reasonable relationship, "nexus," between the activity
contemplated by the private land owner and the regulation imposed); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that a
temporary regulatory taking required the payment of just compensation); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (sustaining Pennsylvania's present surface
land subsidence law); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (rejecting a facial challenge to a
zoning ordinance); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (sustaining
the city's historic district ordinance against a taking challenge).
5. See Wflliam Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compen-
sation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE LJ. 694 (1985) [hereinafter Treanor, Original
Significance]; William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 Couit. L. Rsv. 782 (1995) [hereinafter Treanor, Original Understand-
ing]. Professor Treanor now seems to concede the point that a taking may arise in other than
physical taking settings. In a recent law review article, he states: "More than one hundred years
have passed since the Supreme Court... established the principle that regulations can run afoul
of the Takings Clause... ." Wdliam Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, The Narratives
of Takings and Compensation Stauaes, 38 VA. & MARY L. REv. 1151 (1997) [hereinafterTreanor,
The Armstrong Principle].
6. 154 U. S. 362 (1894).
7. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
8. Id. at 415.
9. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In this case, the
Court, citing Pennsylvania Coal, notes that "a state statute that substantially furthers important
public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a tak-
ing." Id. at 127. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which also cited Pennsylvania
Coal, the Court noted that:
If... the uses of private property were subject to unbridled, uncompensated qualifi-
cation under the police power, 'the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to
extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappearfed].'
These considerations gave birth in that case to the oft-cited maxim that, 'while prop-
erty may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking.'
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing Pennsylvania Coal. 260 U.S.
393,415 (1922)) (alteration in original).
10. See Treanor, Original Significance, supra note 5; Treanor, Original Understanding. su-
pra note 5; Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, supra note 5; J. Peter Byrne, Ten Argument ifor
the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 EcotOo LQ. 89 (1995).
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similated into the taking jurisprudence of every state.11 In short, the concept of
regulatory taking is a fixed part of taking jurisprudence. It is both the more inter-
esting and the more difficult dimension of this jurisprudence. The physical taking
cases have become the easier part of the constitutional mandate.12
This Article focuses on regulatory takings-what we know, what we don't
know, and what seems likely (in the nation and in Maine) in this area of taking law.
It will draw most heavily on recent United States Supreme Court case law, but
other federal and state cases, and both federal and state legislation (some pro-
posed, some enacted) aimed at clarifying the Fifth Amendment's mandate will
also be examined. The purpose of the Article is to suggest that the Taking Clause
is alive and well, that its meaning is not as obscure as some would suggest. 13
Though there is not universal agreement as to all of the factors that must be exam-
ined in a regulatory taking analysis, nor the weight to be given any one factor (or
group of factors) in such an analysis, there is general agreement that taking ques-
tions involve several important factors, and that each must be accorded weight.
There is also agreement on the need to balance competing public and private rights
as they exist in any individual setting, particularly one potentially subject to a
taking challenge. 14
It should also be noted in this introduction that extreme views with respect to
takings have not fared well in the courts. The extremes consist of two groups-
11. See, e.g., Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 450 A.2d 475
(Me. 1982). In this case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, approv-
ingly cites the "if regulation goes too far" language of Pennsylvania Coal, and then notes that,
"whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for
any losses proximately caused by it depends largely upon the particular circumstances [in that]
case." lit at 482 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978))
(alteration in original).
12. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that
the placing of cable equipment on private property pursuant to state statute was a small but very
real physical occupation of the property that required payment of just compensation); see also
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (reinforcing the Loretto
holding). The only live issue that sometimes arises in physical taking cases involves the mean-
ing and measurement of "just compensation." See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for
Takings: How Much Is Just, 42 CA=. U. L. REv. 721 (1993); Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
Hw. L. Rev. 1165 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Richard 1. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in the Supreme
Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1099 (1997); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical
Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MiCH. L. REV. 1892 (1992); Andrea L. Peterson,
The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I-A Critique of Current Takings
Clause Doctrine, 77 CAt. L. REv. 1299 (1989), Part l-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of
Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. Rev. 53, 58 (1990) ("But despite this chaos,
there seems to be a general pattern to the results reached by the Court in its takings decisions.
One can often predict how the Court will ultimately rule in a takings case .... ").
14. See, e.g., James E. Brookshire, The Delicate Art of Balance-Ruminations on Change
and Expectancy in Local Land Use, 38 WM. & MAR, L. REv. 1047 (1997); see also, K & K
Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998). Lower Michigan
courts had found a taking; Michigan's highest court remanded because the relevant parcel for
purposes of a taking inquiry had not been correctly defined. More important, the high court
recognized that this was not a categorical taking case, and, therefore, upon remand the taking
question required a "balancing analysis." Id. at 539. The court went on to identify many of the
factors that must be weighed in that analysis.
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property rights absolutists, on one hand, who see all regulation as a compensable
taking,15 and on the other hand, over-zealous land use planners andlor environ-
mentalists who would regulate property rights almost to the point of extinction. 16
Both groups have been active in Maine over the last several years. Both have
15. See, e.g., E'srme, Timancs, supra note 2. In that piece, Epstein argues that all govern-
mental actions, regulations, and intrusions on a property owner's use or control of (hislher)
private property (except nuisance abatement, narrowly defined) trigger a Fifth Amendment duty
to pay; government's only alternative is to forebear. See also Proceedings of the Conference on
Takings of Propeny and the Constitution, 41 U. OF Mw L Ray. 49 (1986); Richard A. Epstein.
A Last Word on Eminent Domain, 41 U. OF Mrmu L REv. 253 (1986); Richard A. Epstein, The
Seven Deadly Sins of Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26
Loy. LA. L REv. 955 (1993) (wherein the author points out the fallacies (in his view) of both the
majority and dissenting Justices reasoning in Lucas and by extension other recent taking cases).
Cf. Rene Erm II, The "Wise Use " Movement: The Constitutionality of Local Action on Federal
Lands under the Preemption Doctrine, 30 ItAHO L. REv. 631 (1994); Patrick Austin Perry. Law
West of the Pecos: The Growth of the Wise Use Movement and the Challenge to Federal Public
Land-Use Policy, 30 LoY. LA. L. REv. 275 (1996); Nid Christopher, Cattle Ranch with Park
Rangers: The Battle for a Tallgrass Prairie National Park in Kansas, 18 ST,. Eva. L.J. 211.
241 (1999) ("Wise Use ideologists believe that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against tak-
ing of private land for public use without just compensation applies to any regulation that dimin-
ishes the value of the land, or impairs the owner's ability to use the land in any way, and that it
mandates compensation at fair market value.").
16. Examples of actual and proposed over-regulation can certainly be found in Maine. For
example, William Hardy, aresident of theTownof Bowdoin, who, faced with theTown's shoreland
zoning ordinance and the Maine State Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) guide-
lines with respect to such lands, could not build even one single family home on the 50 acre
parcel he owned. See Dieter Bradbury, DEP May Loosen Wetland Lans, M .S UAYTELw c s,
Dec. 20,1992, at BI. In a similar vein, the Maine Sunday Telegram reported the plight of Frank
Carroll who owned 320 acres of gravel rich property in Newfield, Maine. See Tux Turkel, Pine
Barrens Hold Up Permit, Ms. Sum AYTa~mme, Mar. 10,1991. atB1. Unfortunately for Carroll,
the property was classified as "pine barren" a rare and environmentally significant land type.
Maintaining that it could have denied Carroll's application to develop the gravel resource out-
right, the DEP indicated it would conditionally approve development of 30 acres. Carroll saw
the conditions as stringent and unworkable; the Natural Resources Council of Maine (NRC) saw
the DEP's concession to Carroll as unwarranted and threatened suit. Interestingly, no public or
private agency offered to buy Carroll's supposedly unique land which throughout the regulatory
proceedings he indicated he was willing to sell. See id. A third example of over-zealous regula-
tion (albeit only a proposal) is found in the Natural Resources Council of Maine's fall 1990
newsletter, TMAn GRownt MANAGEMaer News. In response to Maine's growth control legisla-
tion, Ma. REv. Sma. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 4301- 4349 (1996), originally adopted in 1989. the NRC
called for literally hundreds of Maine towns to concentrate new development in village centers
by adopting 20 acre minimum lot size requirements in significant portions of each toa See
Facing the Future in Deerfield: The Implications of Three Different Land Use Strategies, MAmnE
Giowni MANAcumENNEws (Natural Resources Council of Maine, Augusta, Me.). Fall 1990, at
4-6. Millions of acres would have been affected by these lot size minimums, which in a sidebar
article the NRC argued would not be a taking. See Finding Common Ground. Private Property
Rights and Growth Management, MAm GROW' m*Am ,rNEs (National Resources Council
of Maine, Augusta, Me.), Fall 1990, at 7. More recently, in February 1997, several members of
the Maine Legislature tendered LD 1198, which would bar all new residential or commercial
structures in an area encompassing 4.5 million acres of Maine forest land (almost one-quarter of
the entire state). See L.D. 1198 (118th Legis. 1997). Private landowners would have bzen left
with whatever economic returns existing structures, primitive recreation, and forest manage-
ment activities would provide. Proponents of the legislation argued this would not be a taking;
the bill was not adopted.
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pushed their respective agenda with ardor and a rhetoric that evidences little un-
derstanding of current taking law.17 But of the two extremes, the over-zealous
environmentalist, planner, bureaucrat and/or regulator, by virtue of his/her status
and position coupled with their duty to know and apply present taking law, would
seem the more ominous. These over-zealous protectors of the landscape utilizing
the paradigm of Pennsylvania Coal, invariably assert that proposed or challenged
regulations (regulations that are often incredibly stringent on their face) do not go
"too far," and thus do not require payment of compensation. 18 They seem never to
have seen a regulation they did not like and were not prepared to defend.
This Article will argue that such doggedness disserves us in many ways. As a
practical matter, it is unlikely to move today's courts. Courts in recent years, par-
ticularly the United States Supreme Court, when faced with either of the extremes
noted, have adopted a more balanced middle ground position on the question of
what constitutes a regulatory taking. There is every indication they will adhere to
this approach for some time to come---over-zealousness simply erodes credibility.
More important, the lack of moderation in some regulators (and those who advise
them) threatens, excites to feverish activity, and gives credibility to the property
rights absolutists. Spokespersons for these views can be counted on to spearhead
further rounds of taking litigation, and worse, they will seek passage of stringent
17. Property rights absolutists in Maine have been active (with some success) in each of the
last four legislative sessions. See An Act To Protect Private Property, L.D. 672 (116th Legis.
1993) (died between houses, June, 1993); AnAct to Require the State and Political Subdivisions
to Pay Property Owners when Regulations Lower the Value of Property by More Than 50%,
L.D. 170 (117th Legis. 1995) (Ought Not To Pass report accepted, July 1995); An Act to Protect
Constitutional Property Rights and to Provide Just Compensation, renamed, Resolve, Establish-
ing the Study Commission on Property Rights and the Public Health, Safety, and Welfare, L.D.
1217 (117th Legis. 1995) (passed, Resolves 1995, ch. 45); AnAct to Implement the Recommen-
dations of the Study Commission on Property Rights and the Public Health, Safety, and Welfare
Establishing a Land Use Mediation Program and Providing for Further Review of Rules, L.D.
1629 (117th Legis. 1995) (enacted, P.L. 1996, ch. 537); Resolution Proposing an Amendment to
the Constitution of Maine to Affirm the Rights to Private Property, L.D. 475 (118th Legis. 1997)
(Ought Not To Pass report accepted, May, 1997); An Act to Require Compensation for Loss of
Property Value Due to State or Local Regulation, L.D. 1257 (118th Legis. 1997) (Ought Not To
Pass report accepted, May 1997); An Act Requiring Compensation for Loss of Property Value
Due to State or Local Regulation, L.D. 470 (119th Legis. 1999) (held over, May, 1999); An Act
Regarding Regulations and Compensation to Property Owners, L.D. 2121 (119th Legis. 1999)
(held over, May, 1999). Though these measures have in general been perceived as unwise, and
an oversimplistic and unwarranted approach to taking issues and 100 years of taking case law,
they have generated considerable discussion. There has almost certainly been some chilling
affect on the regulatory process, and a mediation mechanism available to landowners claiming a
regulatory taking (albeit a limited and temporary one) now exists. See Ms. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ 3341 (West Supp. 1999).
18. They also frequently point to the laudable character of the ends that would be served by
the regulation and/or they point out the paucity of tax resources that makes use of the spending
power to achieve the ends sought politically and practically impossible. But neither of these
factors override or repeal Fifth Amendment mandates. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393,416 (1922) ("We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change."). The same view was expressed more recently by
Justice Scalia in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987).
[Vol. 52:2
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new legislative initiatives 19 aimed at protecting property rights- initiatives that,
if adopted, would set the cause of necessary and reasonable regulation back for
many years to come.
In short, a more accurate understanding and acceptance of current taking law
by those who would protect us is more likely (than is the rhetoric of the extremes)
to preserve regulatory credibility in judicial forums and continued public accep-
tance of reasonable regulations. Such understanding and acceptance will not end,
but is more likely to blunt, the litigation and legislative strategies of the absolut-
ists.
IL THE CATEGORICAL TAKINGS
Before getting to the heart of this Article, it seems sensible to note and dispose
of the two so-called per se or categorical classes of taking recognized to date by
the United States Supreme Court. Neither arose frequently in the past, and high-
lighted as they have been by the Court, one can only believe that they will arise
infrequently (more often by mistake than for any other reason) in the future. The
first involves statutes or regulations (of any type) that give rise to a physical inva-
sion of private property-this is a taking per se. The leading case is Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CA7V Corp.,2 0 a case that found a taking where a state
statute, without compensation, required property owners to provide physical space
(albeit small) for cable equipment.2 1 This holding was reinforced in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council2 2 The Lucas Court noted: "[N]o matter how minute
the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have
required compensation." 23
The second type of categorical or per se taking arose and was laid out in the
Lucas case.2 4 As the Court notes, it occurs "where regulation denies all economi-
cally beneficialor productive use of land."25 In such cases, "when the owner of
19. Quite apart from legislative initiatives we have seen in Maine, supra note 17, other states
and the Congress of the United States have considered property rights legislation. Detailed
examination of these legislative initiatives is beyond the scope of this Article, but other scholas
have catalogued and examined the pros and cons of these proposals in some detail. See, e.g.,
Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 2, at 162 & n.10; Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, supra
noteS 5, at 1152 &nn.7-10; Ann L Renhard Cole, State Private Property Acts: The Potentalfor
Implicating Federal Environmental Problems, 76 Tx. L. Rav. 685 (1998); Mark W. Cordis,
Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 EcoLoGY L.Q. 187
(1997); E. Donald Elliott, How Takings Legislation Could Improve Environmental Regulation,
38 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 1177 (1997); Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Prop-
erty, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WAsH. & Lea L REv. 265, 287-97
(1996); Robert C. Ellickson, Takings Legislation: A Comment, 20 HIMv. J.L. & PUB. Poi.'y 75
(1996).
20. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
21. See id. at 421.
22. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
23. Id. at 1015.
24. See id. at 1015-19.
25. Id. at 1015. Justice Scalia recognizes that the central question that grows out of Pennsyl-
vania Coal-when does a regulation go too far-has never been fully answered. He acknowl-
edges that it will not be answered in any detail by Lucas, which deals only with an extreme
situation (a situation where regulation reduces the value of land to zero). But Justice Scalia
makes clear that when that extreme is reached, we have gone too far-there is a categorical or
per se taking. See id. at 1015-16.
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real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses..
he has suffered a [categorical] taking." 26
m19. CRITICAL FACTORS IN A REGULATORY TAKING ANALYSIS
A. The Governmental (Public) Purpose or State Interest Factor
Perhaps the most widely recognized and frequently cited requirement for a
regulation to be found valid (not a taking, or a violation of due process) is that it
"substantially advance legitimate state interests. ' 2 7 A leading New York case,
French Investment Co. v. City of New York,2 8 put it in very similar terms: "A
zoning ordinance is unreasonable [a taking] ... if it encroaches on the exercise of
private property rights without substantial relation to a legitimate governmental
purpose. A legitimate governmental purpose is, of course, one which furthers the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare."2 9
In fact, establishing a legitimate governmental purpose has not proven to be a
particularly difficult requirement for governmental regulators to meet. When con-
trols that were adopted in good faith are challenged, public officials are usually
able to demonstrate that some aspect (often more than one) of the public's health,
safety, or general welfare is actually being served by the measure in question. The
key to such a showing is often a comprehensive plan and/or empirical data that
clearly demonstrates the need for, and rationality of, the control in the particular
setting. But when a public purpose cannot be found or is at best a makeweight-
when the avowed public purpose is really only a mask designed to hide impermis-
sible or more cynical governmental motives-courts have not been reluctant to
strike the offending regulation down. For example, the court in National Land &
Investment Co. v. Kohn3 0 noted that:
A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of new-
comers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the ad-
ministration of public services and facilities cannot be held valid... the general
welfare is not fostered or promoted by a zoning ordinance designed to be exclu-
sive and exclusionary.
31
26. Id. at 1019. See also Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 952 (1991) (holding that provisions of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act, as applied to plaintiff's property, prevented all beneficial use of the property
and, under the rationale of Pennsylvania Coal, constituted a taking). The Court noted that "the
diminution in value [of Whitney coal] was total," and the statute "goes too far." Id. at 1172,
1174. On the taking issues presented, this case anticipated almost completely the reasoning and
holding of Lucas.
27. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
28. 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
29. Id. at 10.
30. 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965).
31. Id. at 612. Similar views have been expressed in many jurisdictions. See Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713,730 (NJ. 1975) (strik-
ing down Mt. Laurel's zoning ordinance and holding that zoning to keep tax rates down and to
keep out certain types of housing was impermissible, and "contrary to the general welfare");
Beck v. Town of Raymond, 394 A.2d 847, 852 (N.H. 1978) (striking down a regulation that
sharply limited the number of building permits that could be issued in any given year and noting
[Vol. 52:2
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The finding of a valid public purpose, a legitimate state interest, does not end
a taking inquiry. A challenged regulation may have cleared an essential first hurdle,
but several other factors must now be examined and weighed before a final deter-
mination can be made as to whether the challenged control is reasonable, or gives
rise to a regulatory taking.
B. The Economically V'able Use or Diminution in Value Factor
The second essential factor in a taking analysis, the idea that property owner-
ship includes an economic element, the right to a reasonable economic return from
the property, is of long standing. In Reagan v. Farners'Loan & Trust Co.,32 the
Court recognized the need for, and legitimacy of, reasonable regulation, but point-
edly noted:
This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the equiva-
lent of confiscation. Under pretence of regulating fares and freights, the State
cannot require a railroad corporation to carry persons or property without re-
ward; neither can it do that which in law amounts to a taking of private property
.... 33
In a similar vein, the Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon34 noted that: "The applica-
tion of a general zoning law to a particular property effects a taking if the ordi-
nance... denies an owner economically viable use of his land... ."35 More recent
United States Supreme Court taling cases, Lucas,3 6 Dolan,3 7 City of Monterey3 8
cite Agins and reaffirm the principle laid out above without reservation.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's assertion that property owners are en-
titled to a reasonable economic return, the Court has never fashioned an approach
that the ordinance's "apparent primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order
to avoid burdens upon public services and facilities. This alone is not a valid public purpose_");
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1187 (8th Cir. 1974) (striking down racially
discriminatory zoning and holding that no governmental interest "is in fact furthered by the
zoning ordinance"); Barnard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Yarmouth, 313 A.2d 741
(Me. 1974). In sustaining the denial of a variance, the Barnard court sounded a warning: "How-
ever, we are mindful that zoning has been used frequently for ends which while ostensibly within
the traditional objectives of zoning--protection of health, safety, morals and general welfare-
are infact unrelated to those purposes." Id. at 745. The court made clear that when it finds this
to e the case it will follow the lead of other jurisdictions and strike down such zoning. In sum,
challenges to police power controls whether premised on a taking theory, an alleged violation of
due process, or an assertion that they exceed the scope of enabling legislation, will succeed (the
offending ordinance will be struck down) when public purpose requirements are not met, andtor
when "legitimate state interests" cannot be found.
32. 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
33. Id. at 398 (quoting Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307,331 (1886)).
34. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
35. Id. at 260. The Agins court cites approvingly Penn Central Transortaion Co. v New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See also French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5
(1976). The French court held that "a zoning ordinance is unreasonable [a taking] ... if it
renders the property unsuitable for any reasonable income productive or other private use for
which it is adapted and thus destroys its economic value, or all but a bare residue of its value."
Id. at 10.
36. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
37. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
38. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S. CL 1624 (1999).
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that precisely answers the question-what level of return is reasonable?3 9 Or put
the other way-what diminution in value (level of economic loss) that is less than
total constitutes a taking? One suspects the Court has eschewed a formulaic ap-
proach to these questions because no precise formula can take into account all of
the variables; indeed such an approach might be more misleading than helpful.4 0
The Court has been content to recognize that the magnitude of economic injury is
only one factor, albeit an important one, in an overall taking analysis that of neces-
sity involves many factors. However, in Lucas, Justice Scalia did indicate (in
dicta) that greater precision with respect to loss of value may today be warranted;
he also seemed to suggest that diminution in value (when it is significant) is a
weighty factor that would justify a taking finding, unless countervailing factors
39. Courts have said that regulation that leads to the loss of some theoretical optimum or
maximum income return from the use of a property does not constitute a taking. See, e.g.,
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). In sustaining regulations limiting commercial transac-
tions in bird parts protected by federal legislation against a taking challenge, the Court noted:
"It is, to be sure, undeniable that the regulations here prevent the most profitable use of appellees'
property. Again, however, that is not dispositive. When we review regulation, a reduction in the
value of property is not necessarily equated with a taking." Id. at 66. See also Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In affirming lower court holdings that had
sustained New York's historic preservation ordinance against a taking challenge, the Court ap-
provingly noted: "The Appellate Division concluded that all appellants had succeeded in
showing was that they had been deprived of the property's most profitable use, and that this
showing did not establish that appellants had been unconstitutionally deprived of their prop-
erty." Id. at 120. A leading Maine taking case takes a similar position. See Seven Islands Land
Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 450 A.2d 475 (Me. 1982). In note 10 of its opin-
ion, the Law Court, drawing on Allard, notes:
The opportunity to use property for future profit is not such a fundamental at-
tribute of ownership. The "loss of future profits. . . provides a slender reed upon
which to rest a taking claim. Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of
reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform."
Id. at 482, n.10 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)).
40. On one hand, cases can certainly be found where regulations have imposed significant
economic losses on individual property owners but, other factors being present, a taking was not
found. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (no taking where regulations
reduced the value of the property approximately 90%); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926) (no taking where zoning regulation reduced the value of the property by
approximately 75%); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (precise valuations
before and after regulation are not given, but the facts of the case indicate that the diminution in
value was very large-no taking). On the other hand, there are cases where regulations gave rise
to only slight (often negligible) diminutions in individual property value, but a taking was found
nonetheless. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (the value of
the lateral easement taken by the regulation was small compared to the full value of the house
and lot, but the absence of a relationship ("nexus") between the regulation and the developer's
activity was held to be a taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982) (the value of the portion of the structure occupied by the cable equipment was small
compared to the full value of the building, but the physical occupation itself constituted a tak-
ing); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (the value of burdens (exactions) imposed on
developers relative to the full value of a proposed development is often small, but the Court
required "proportionality"; i.e., that the burden imposed on a particular developer be commen-
surate with the harm his development will give rise to). In short, there does not appear to be any
arithmetical (bright-line) cutoff with respect to diminutions in value occasioned by regulation
that would signal when there is, and when there is not, a taking-too many other factors are
involved. Courts have long recognized this fact.
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which wouldjustify the regulation are present.41 Scalia is not alone in these views.
Other federal and state courts have taken this position in a growing body of hold-
ings on this point.4 2
C. The Distinct (Reasonable) Investment-Backed Expectations Factor
Quite apart from the "economically viable use or diminution in value" factor,
courts at least since Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City 3 have
recognized a second separate economic dimension in their taking analysis: the
degree to which the challenged regulation has affected the investment-backed ex-
pectations of the property owner. The Penn Central Court's reasoning is instruc-
tive:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, (a taking analysis] the
Court's decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance.
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the ex-
tent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations are, of course, relevant considerations.44
The Court went on to find that the historic district ordinance in question in Penn
Central did not effectuate a taking in large part because the original use expecta-
tions of the property owner had not been upset by the regulatory scheme.4 5 The
Court concluded: "[Th New York City law does not interfere... with what must
be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation [to continue to use the property
as a railroad terminal] concerning use of the parceL ' 46 In other factual settings the
converse must also be regarded as a possibility; a regulation might so curtail a
property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations that a taking is found.
41. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-19 & nn.7-8 (1992).
42. See, e.g., Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332,341 (1992) (holding that a regulation
that reduced the value of a property from S933,921 to $112,000 was a taking); Florida Rock
Indus. Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Although the Florida Rock case was
remanded to the court of claims to determine the present fair market value of the land, the
Federal Circuit made clear that in its view, significant diminutions in value that art less than
total might well give rise to a taking. See id, at 1572-73. A Maine district court case, decided by
Judge Saufley, who is now an Associate Justice on the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, employed
similar reasoning, although the form of the regulatory control (an order to make improveen ts
as opposed to a regulatory limitation) is different from the usual case See City of Portland v.
Tracy-Causer Assoc., Inc., No. 91-LU-006 (Me. Dist. CL 9, S. CuM., Oct. 20, 1993) (Saufley,
J.). The court noted that:
The required expenditure of $100,000 or more to prevent further deterioration of an
historic building which cannot be rented, nor inhabited in any way even with the
required expenditure, is found to be "inordinately burdensome." As the Supreme
Court reiterated after its analysis of taking law to date in Lucas, a "state, by ipse dixit,
may not transform private property into public property without compensation
... Mhe city's order requiring repairs to the building affects an unconstitutional
taldng of defendant's property ....
Id. at 8-10 (citations omitted). But see Wyer v. Board Of Envtl. Protection, 2000 ME 45, 747
A.2d 192 (finding no taking in a setting where the diminution in value was 50").
43. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
44. Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
45. See id. at 136.
46. Id. See also id at 138 n.36.
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A case in point is Formanek v. United States,4 7 wherein the court recognized that it
"must further consider the owners' investment-backed expectations."'48
It is beyond question that the property was purchased for the sole purpose of
industrial development Mr. Formanek and his partners were not aware of the
unique nature of the property nor did they ever intend to purchase a nature con-
servancy. The court finds that the dramatic reduction in the property's value as a
result of the permit denial combined with the government's interference with the
plaintiffs' investment-backed expectations, constitutes a taking.49
A recent Michigan case, K & K Construction, Inc. v. Department of Natural
Resources,50 also saw the diminution in value factor and the investment-backed
expectations factor as two separate and distinct factors. The case was remanded
because the relevant parcel for purposes of a taking analysis had not been correctly
determined below;5 1 the court also recognized it was not dealing with a categori-
cal taking case.5 2 Upon remand the court required that a balancing analysis be
used; some of the factors in the balance were identified: "(1) the character of the
governmental action, (2) the economic effect of the regulation on the claimant, and
(3) the extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations."'5 3 Although the court's descriptive language differs slightly from
the language used in this Article, the factors the court would examine to determine
whether a taking has occurred closely parallel the taking analysis factors laid out
to this point.
D. The Nexus Factor
This fourth factor in a taking analysis was driven home by Justice Scalia's
reasoning in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,54 but it has roots in earlier
state court taking cases which require regulations to bear some relationship to (to
be made necessary by) what a developer is doing.55 A nexus analysis is prepared
to assume that a valid governmental purpose exists. In Nollan, the provision of a
pathway along the foreshore is almost certainly a valid governmental undertaking.
47. 26 C. Ct. 332 (1992).
48. Id. at 340.
49. IM at 340-41 (emphasis added). It will almost always be the case that a regulation which
interferes with a property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations will also give
rise to a significant diminution in the value of the property, but this fact should not obscure the
point the court is making: these are separate factors in a taking analysis. Whether either factor
standing alone would support a finding that there is a taking is problematic, but their combined
and mutually reinforcing effect in Formanek seems to amply support the court's finding of a
taking.
50. 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998).
51. See i at533.
52. See id at 539.
53. Id. at 539-40.
54. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
55. See J.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12 (N.H. 1981) (holding that the
town's zoning ordinance was a taking). The ordinance contained a blanket requirement that
developers dedicate 7.5% of their total land or pay a fee in lieu of dedication for park and open
space purposes, without regard to the actual needs of the town or the nature of the development.
The court referred to this as "an out-and-out plan of extortion." Id. at 14. See also French Inv.
Co. v. City of New York, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1978) (arguing in favor of the need for zoning ordi-
nance requirements that bear a "substantial relation" to governmental purposes). The French
court's further observation that there must be a "reasonable relation" between means and ends
makes a similar point. Id at 10.
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The diminution in value caused by the regulation may well be slight. The nexus
factor focuses on the relationship between what the property owner-developer is
undertaking and the requirements that the regulation imposes. The Nollans were
building a house-one that might impair a scenic view. Justice Scalia pointed out
that there are any number of conditions that the regulating authority might have
imposed relative to the height, the positioning of the building on the lot, fencing,
even a requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing area, that would almost
certainly have been sustainable.5 6 Though not mentioned, conditions addressing
any and all safety aspects of the structure or that would have guarded against ero-
sion during construction would also seem permissible.
But conditions of this type were not imposed by the California Coastal Com-
mission; one can only assume that the design plan of the Nollans made such condi-
tions unnecessary. Instead, development approval and issuance of the required
building permit was conditioned on the Nollans granting an easement of lateral
passage along the high tide line of their property for use by the public. Justice
Scalia bluntly points out that the imposition of such a condition is unrelated to
what the Nollans are doing (building a house), and thus is constitutionally imper-
missible-it is a taking. 57 In other words, to be constitutional, conditions imposed
by a regulatory body must ameliorate a harm, be made necessary by, or grow out
of the proposed development. If they do not, there is no nexus. The "restriction
[condition] is not a valid regulation of land use 'but an out-and-out plan of extor-
tion." 5 8 Strong language perhaps, but Nollan does give us one more useful factor
in determining when regulation goes "too far" and thus becomes a regulatory tak-
ing.
E. The Proportionality Factor
This fifth factor in the array of factors courts draw upon in a regulatory taking
analysis has been given prominence by yet another recent United States Supreme
Court case, Dolan v. City of 7igard.59 Proportionality analysis, like nexus analy-
sis, is prepared to assume that a valid governmental purpose exists. It is prepared
to assume that any cost or diminution in value (standing alone) caused by the
regulation would not rise to the level of a taking; it also assumes that nexus re-
quirements are met. Proportionality, according to the Dolan analysis, begins where
nexus leaves offi,60 it raises questions of scale and (un)faimess with respect to
demands made of a developer in the context of obtaining development approval.61
56. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comrnm'n, 483 U.S. at 836.
57. See id.
58. 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (1981)).
59. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
60. See id at 386-88.
61. A homely example may be helpful. If a proposed retail expansion would, on the basis of
reasonable planning judgments, give rise to a need for five to seven additional off-street parking
spaces, police power regulations could undoubtedly address this need; public purpose and nexus
requirements are almost self-evidently met. The key question is: how many off-street parking
spaces could the regulation require? A regulation that required the developer to build a new
parking garage, or to provide 100 new spaces, or even 50 spaces, would seem to go "too far"; it
would rise to the level of a taking under Dolan's proportionality reasoning. But a requirement
that 5, 10, even 15 spaces be provided would seem sustainable; it is proportional to the need
created and such a requirement is unlikely to give rise to significant added costs and/or diminu-
tions in value so as to constitute a taking on this basis.
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The Dolan Court, after finding nexus in the case before it, put the issue this way:
"The second part of our analysis requires us to determine whether the degree of the
exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions bear the required relationship
to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed development." 62 The Court would
then reject standards that are either "too lax" or unduly "exacting" with respect to
this relationship. 63 It settled on a standard that requires "a showing of a reason-
able relationship" between the need the development gives rise to and the regula-
tory requirement imposed.64 Summing up its point, the Dolan Court said: "We
think a term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be
the requirement of the Fifth Amendment." 65 Finally, the Court casts the burden of
demonstrating the reasonableness of any required dedication (and one must be-
lieve any fee in lieu of a required dedication) on the enacting government. The
Court noted that: "No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication
is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." 66
This aspect of the Court's opinion sparked sharp dissent, but the majority was not
dissuaded; it no doubt believed that an enacting government is in the best position
to demonstrate the reasonableness of its regulation. If it does, there is no taking; if
it can not do so, proportionality requirements are not met-there is a regulatory
taking.
F The Armstrong Factor
This sixth factor in a regulatory taking analysis draws its name from the lead-
ing case that laid out its underlying rationale, Armstrong v. United States.67 In
62. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. at 388.
63. See id. at 389.
64. Id. at 390-91. Here again the United States Supreme Court draws on the reasoning of,
and cites approvingly, a number of state highest court holdings. See, e.g., Jordan v. Menommonee
Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965) (holding that subdivision controls that require land dedica-
tions and/or fees for schools, parks, and playgrounds that the subdivision in whole or in part
creates a need for, are a valid exercise of police power, and that where the value of such dedica-
tions and fees fall well below actual public expenditures for these facilities, reasonableness
requirements are met); Colls v. Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976). The Minnesota
court's reasoning is particularly apt.
A municipality could use dedication regulations to exact land or fees from a subdi-
vider far out of proportion to the needs created by his subdivision in order to avoid
imposing the burden of paying for additional services on all citizens via taxation. To
tolerate this situation would be to allow an otherwise acceptable exercise of police
power to become grand theft. But the enabling statute here prevents this from occur-
ring by authorizing dedication of only a "reasonable portion" of land for the purposes
stated.
Id. at 26. See also College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984) (holding
that on remand the trial court must determine whether there is a reasonable connection between
the increased population arising from the subdivision development and the park and recreation
land dedications required by the ordinance).
65. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. at 391.
66. Id.
67. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). See also William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, supra
note 5; John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model For The Taking
Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465 (1983). Costonis, in addressing some due process considerations
in a taking analysis, refers to this factor as the "just share" principle and traces its roots to cases
that predate Armstrong. I& at 486-87.
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brief, the narrow issue raised by Armstrong is whether a regulation falls on too few
property owners and thus gives rise to a taking or impacts a reasonable class of
property owners (if not all property owners in a jurisdiction) and thus is sustain-
able, at least with respect to this dimension of a taking analysis. The Armstrong
Court put it succinctly: "Tbe Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property
shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."68 This consider-
ation was a central issue in the previously cited Penn Centra69 case, a case that
had challenged New York City's historic preservation ordinance that by definition
impacted a relatively small group of property owners (those who owned historic
properties) more than the general class of property owners in the city.70 The ma-
jority in Penn Central acknowledged the validity of Armstrongl but they implic-
itly concluded that the ordinance fell on a large enough class of property owners to
withstand a taking challenge.72 Justice Rehnquist's dissent in the case, concurred
in by two other members of the Court, rather elaborately lays out the opposite
view. On the rationale of Armstrong they would have found a taking. "Appellees
have imposed a substantial cost on less than one-tenth of one percent of the build-
ings in New York City for the general benefit of all its people. It is exactly this
imposition of general costs on a few individuals at which the 'taking' protection is
directed. 73 The dissent then cites Armstrong and several other United States Su-
preme Court cases that elaborate the underlying principle.7 4 The significance of
this factor in a taking analysis is underscored by the fact that all nine of the Penn
Central justices advert to Armstrong; the majority would draw the line defining an
appropriately burdened group at a different point than would the dissenters, but the
entire Court understands the fairness, equal protection, and taking principles at
stake.
68. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. at 49. See also Nollan v. Califoria Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987); supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia makes clear in
Nollan that had he not decided the case (found the regulation to be a taking) on "nexus" grounds,
he might well have reached the same result applying the reasoning ofArnswrng. In a footnote,
he states: "If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California's attempt to
remedy these problems [beachfront access], although they had not contributed to it mor than
other coastal landowners, the State's action, even if otherwise valid, might violate either the
incorporated Takings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause." Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. at 835 n.4. Scalia then cites Armstrong and several other United States
Supreme Court cases that have embraced this principle. See i&
69. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
70. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
71. See i& at 123.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74. See id. at 148-50.
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G. The Avoiding a Hann as Opposed to Acquiring a Benefit Factor
Many would argue that the significance of this long-standing factor in a tak-
ing analysis 75 has been eroded, if not rejected outright, by the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, notes "that the distinction between regulation that 'prevents harmful
use' and that which 'confers benefits' is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on
an objective, value-free basis." 76 In a footnote he says that skillful staff can al-
most always fashion a harm-avoiding justification for even the most stringent regu-
lation; 77 he then reasons that if this alone becomes the touchstone for avoiding a
taking claim, the protections of Pennsylvania Coal78 become a nullity. In short,
Justice Scalia sees the harm-benefit dichotomy as little more than a semantic game
that should not deflect us from a more penetrating taking analysis. Justice Scalia's
logic is certainly correct. But experience and common sense, not logic, is likely to
lead many courts (notwithstanding the semantic risks) to continue to examine (as
one of many factors to be examined) whether the regulation in question primarily
addresses real risks and/or public safety issues in a manner that seeks to avoid
harm, or seems primarily aimed at creating and/or acquiring some type of public
benefit.7 9 Controls of the first type will more readily withstand a taking chal-
75. An important state taking case, Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972),
sustaining stringent shoreland controls against a taking challenge, traced the roots of this factor
to the early writings of ErnsT Fwuano, THE PoucE Powmt (1904) and 1 CHARLES A. RATmxoP,
THE LAW OF ZONNG AND PLANNING (1956) (particularly Vol. 1, ch. 6, § 6.6). See Just v. Merinette
County, 201 N.W.2d at 767. The Just court, quoting Professor Freund, lays out the factor as
follows:
"It may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to
the public, and under the police power because it is harmful... [sic] From this results
the difference between the power of eminent domain and the police power, that the
former recognizes a right to compensation, while the latter on principle does not."
Thus the necessity for monetary compensation for loss suffered to an owner by police
power restriction arises when restrictions are placed on property in order to create a
public benefit rather than to prevent a public harm.
Id. (alteration in original). See also Lynda 1. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit" and
"Average Reciprocity of Advantage" Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L.
REv. 1449 (1997).
76. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992).
77. See id. at 1025 n.12.
78. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
79. Though the categories of"harm avoiding" and "benefit acquiring" are neither self-defin-
ing nor mutually exclusive, it is often possible from the facts, the record, and the legislative
history of the regulatory control in question to determine the primary motivational consideration(s)
underlying a challenged control. For example, regulations addressing land uses in a two or five-
year flood plain or on steep slopes prone to heavy rains and flash-flooding speak for themselves.
The dangers are real, and though the controls could be characterized as acquiring a floodway or
greenbelt benefit, common sense and experience suggests that the controls are primarily aimed
at harm avoidance. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Ct. App. 1989). The United States Supreme Court had used
this case as a vehicle for holding that a temporary taking must be compensated. See First En-
glish Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
On remand, California's Court of Appeal found there was no taking; it noted: "The zoning
regulation challenged in the instant case involves [the] highest of public interests-the preven-
tion of death and injury. Its enactment was prompted by the loss of life in an earlier flood. And
its avowed purpose is to prevent the loss of lives in future floods." First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 904. In the court's view, the harm-
avoiding character of the regulation was self-evident.
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lenge; controls of the latter type are, and should be, more vulnerable to such a
challenge.
H. The Vhole or Relevant Parcel Factor (a.ka., the "Denominator"
Parcel Factor)0
This eighth factor in a regulatory taldng analysis is increasingly being focused
upon by courts, regulators, and property owners. To date, it has not received the
attention or the refinement that its importance in a regulatory taldng analysis would
seem to dictate.81 The question put simply is-when regulation gives rise to a
diminution in value, what is the tract or parcel of land (and, of course, the value of
that tract) against which the diminution is to be measured? To respond the whole
tract or parcel, begs the question. What is the whole parcel in settings where land
On the other hand, regulations that talk generally about landslide risks and steep slopes but
that require a vast area of more or less developable land to remain in its natural condition with-
out opportunity for the landowner to meet reasonable development conditions andfor to amelio-
rate whatever real harms exist also speak for themselves. Harm avoidance here is a make-
weight; common sense and experience suggest that a public benefit (open space) is being taken
under the guise of police power control. See Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 528 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1985). In Corrigan, regulations barred all development on over 3,500 acres of plaintiff's
land; Arizona's intermediate appellate court, while purporting not to be examining legislative
motives, nonetheless noted-
This evidence tended to show that the primary motivation in proposing the ordinance
was to preserve the McDowell Mountains in their natural state for the benefit of all
residents of the City. Distilled, Corrigan's argument is that the primary purpose of the
ordinance is to obtain a permanent mountain preserve for the public without cost.
Id. at 532-33. The court went on to find the transferable development rights scheme outlined in
the zoning controls to be a taking. See id. at 539. From the standpoint of harmb e.nefit analysis,
both cases seem correctly decided.
80. See Michelman, supra note 12. Michelman was probably the first scholar to put the
taking analysis in the form of a fraction, the numerator is the value removed by a regulation, the
denominator being the full value of the unregulated parcel. See id. at 1192. But in his next
breath Michelman recognized "[t]he difficulty... of how to define the 'particular thing' [parcel]
whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction." Id In Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), the United States Supreme Court recognized this
same difficulty; the Court noted:
Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has
been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property, one of the
critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property "whose value is to
furnish the denominator of the fraction."
Id. at 497 (citing Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairnes: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAtv. L Rnv. 1165, 1192 (1967)).
81. This point was recognized most recently by Justice Scalia in Lacas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically feasible
use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the "property
interest" [parcel] against which the loss of value is to be measured.... Unsurprisingly,
this uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in our "deprivation"
fi-action has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court.
Id. at 1016 n.7. Though the United States Supreme Court has still not given us the degree of
clarity that might be desired on this point, lower federal and state courts addressing the whole or
relevant (the denominator) parcel problem, have improved the tools enabling this parcel to be
defined with increasing fairness and accuracy, particularly in more complex settings.
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is subdivided and resubdivided over time, or where larger more developable par-
cels are assembled by acquiring individual holdings one at a time over a period of
time? The general rule applicable in straightforward settings where the landowner
acquired and holds a single tract of land is beguilingly simple-taking analysis
focuses on the single tract characterizing it "the whole parcel." The diminution in
value caused by a regulation is measured against the value of this whole parcel,
and weighing this factor along with others, a taking may or may not be found.
Courts in many jurisdictions have proceeded along these lines.82 The United States
Supreme Court, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, has em-
braced this view.
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been en-
tirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has ef-
fected a taking, this Court focuses ... on the nature and extent of the interference
with rights in the parcel as a whole .... 83
But the straightforward case can quickly become infinitely more complicated
if a range of not uncommon variables is introduced. For example, when contigu-
ously held land has been acquired a tract at a time and/or developed and sold off in
stages over a number of years but now faces new regulatory controls that will
sharply reduce allowable future development (controls that are arguably a taking),
is the whole or relevant parcel for examining the taking question the remaining
82. See, e.g., Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 450 A.2d 475
(Me. 1982) (sustaining stringent cutting regulations in deer yard areas against a taking chal-
lenge). The court did not focus on the 550, plus or minus, acres subject to regulation but on the
25,000 acres of abutting and contiguous land owned by the plaintiffs. See id. at 482-83. In
Moskow v. Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Management, 427 N.E.2d 750
(Mass. 1981), the court, in sustaining wetlands controls, did not focus on the 55% of the parcel
that was designated wetland and could not be built upon, but on plaintiff's entire parcel which
allowed anywhere from one to four residential structures to be built. See id. at 753. In Zealy v.
City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 1996), the court sustained wetlands conservancy regu-
lations against a taking challenge. In doing so, it did not focus on the more stringently regulated
8.2 acre portion of a parcel encompassing a total of 10.4 acres; instead, the court focused on the
entire parcel and pointedly noted that the remaining 2.2 acres were zoned for commercial and
residential use having significant economic value. See id. at 533-34. This case is also notewor-
thy for its thorough discussion of a range of federal and state cases exploring the relevant parcel
issue. See id. at 532-34.
83. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). The same point
is made in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (sustaining provisions of the Eagle Protection
Act against a taking challenge). In Allard, the Court noted:
[A] significant restriction has been imposed on one means of disposing of the arti-
facts. But the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a
taking. At least where an owner possesses a full "bundle" of property rights, the
destruction of one "strand" of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must
be viewed in its entirety.
Id. at 65-66. This was the approach taken in Keystone Bituminous CoalAss'n v. DeBenedictis,
480 U.S. at 497, where legislation aimed at preventing surface subsidence was sustained against
a taking challenge. The Court, citing both Penn Central and Allard, did not focus on the 2% of
underground coal that would be left in place by the regulation but on the entire mineral estate
subject to regulation. See id. at 496; see also Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construc-
tion Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 643-44 (1993) (citing the "whole
parcel" reasoning of Penn Central in a setting that did not involve land use issues).
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undeveloped portion of the property?84 Or, is the whole or relevant parcel the
largest tract that may have existed at some point in the past?85 When contiguously
held land has been acquired a tract at a time, cannot an argument be made that each
acquired tract is entitled to be treated separately for purposes of a taking analy-
sis--after all in a transactional sense each parcel is separate? Is not this argument
strengthened if the individual and separately acquired tracts are separated by man-
made or natural barriers (roads, utility rights-of-way, railway lines, rivers)?8 6 And
is not this argument strengthened further if the individual and separately acquired
tracts are subject to different and economically more or less valuable zoning con-
trols--controls that may have been enacted (or amended) at different times?
None of these questions admit of any quick, simple, or self-evident answer.
The questions only underscore what many courts have recognized, i.e., that defin-
ing the so-called relevant or denominator parcel for the purpose of beginning a
taking analysis (once we are beyond the most simple settings) is a difficult and an
inherently factual inquiry in which reasonable balances must be struck. Courts
have also recognized that this determination is an essential first step in any taking
analysis. On this latter point, a recent Michigan case, K & K Construction, Inc. v.
Department of Natural Resources,87 noted:
Before we decide whether the regulations imposed on plaintiffs' property
constitute a taking, we must first address an important preliminary matter. The
first step in our analysis is to determine which parcel or parcels owned by plain-
tiffs are relevant for the taking inquiry. The determination of what is referred to
as the 'denominator parcel' is important because it often affects the analysis of
what economically viable uses remain for a person's property alter the regula-
tions are imposed.88
Turning then to an array of factual inquiries that would facilitate the delineat-
ing of the relevant or denominator parcel, the K & K court approvingly drew upon
Ciampitti v. United States.89 The Ciarapitti court noted:
84. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(focusing on the remaining undeveloped parcel of land, not the larger 250-acre tract it had once
been a part of, and finding a taking).
85. See Sibson v. State, 336 A.2d 239,241 (N.H. 1975) (holding there was not a taking and
reasoning that although wetland regulations applied to the entire remaining four-acre parcel.
development that had already taken place on the larger original parcel had in the aggregate
provided the landowner with reasonable economic return). Another layer of complexity in these
types of settings is readily apparent-would not the whole or relevant parcel for purposes of a
taking analysis be affected by time-frame factors? In settings where the assembling, develop-
ment, and sale of tracts began thirty or more years ago, long before the present controls could
have been anticipated, the relevant parcel would almost certainly be different from settings where
the whole development activity unfolded over the last twelve to eighteen months when the shape
of present controls was either actually or constructively known to the developer.
86. Here again, the real world can be expected to give rise to an added layer of complexity-
the character of barriers could alter the concept of contiguousness; thus, the parcel that would be
looked to in a taking dispute is subject to wide variation. Is the road a narrow dirt track or an
interstate highway with the nearest access point several miles away? Is the waterbody an inter-
mittent stream or a permanent waterbody of considerable width? Is the utility right-of-way a
line of telephone poles or a 100-yard-wide energy transmission corridor?
87. 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998).
88. ld. at 535-36.
89. 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991).
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In the case of a landowner who owns both wetlands and adjacent uplands, it
would clearly be unrealistic to focus exclusively on the wetlands, and ignore
whatever rights might remain in the uplands.... Factors such as the degree of
contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the parcel has been treated
as a single unit, the extent to which the protected lands enhance the value of
remaining lands, and no doubt many others would enter the calculus.90
In short, a growing number of courts have recognized that in more complex set-
tings the whole or relevant parcel (the denominator parcel), can only be deter-
mined by looking at and fairly (reasonably) balancing an array of variables. No
pat or formulaic approach seems possible. The Ciampitti court apparently shares
this view:
The effect of a taking can obviously be disguised if the property at issue is too
broadly defined. Conversely, a taking can appear to emerge if the property is
viewed too narrowly. The effort should be to identify the parcel as realistically
and fairly as possible, given the entire factual and regulatory environment.9 1
To reiterate a point made at the outset of this section-all parties (regulators, prop-
erty owners, courts) are increasingly focusing on this factor in a taking analysis;
they must because regulations are becoming more numerous and land holdings
more complex. The whole parcel approach is overly simplistic-it leaves too many
questions unanswered. It seems safe to predict that an increasing body of case law
will emerge on this point-and even if no magic bullet or bright line test defining
the relevant or denominator parcel in more complex settings is produced, this case
90. Id. at 318. The same sort of searching factual inquiry to determine the denominator
parcel is required in East Cape May Associates v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection, 693 A.2d 114 (NJ. 1997). Overturning a lower court finding that there was a taking,
the appellate court noted:
Determining the takings denominator in the present case requires a much more com-
plete factual record than now exists. What entities own or owned the property west of
Pittsburgh Avenue? What part of it, if any, do those entities still retain? When did
they build on it and when were any parts of it disposed of? What is the relationship of
East Cape May to the entities which own or owned the property west of Pittsburgh
Avenue? When and for what consideration was the land on either side of Pittsburgh
Avenue acquired? When, why, and for what consideration was the property east of
Pittsburgh Avenue transferred to its present ownership? What part of the property
west of Pittsburgh Avenue was subject to wetlands controls or other governmental
restrictions while it was owned by East Cape May's principals or transferors? What is
the current municipal zoning of the property? Is there any difference in the zoning
applicable to the land east and west of Pittsburgh Avenue? Was development re-
stricted to the western tract in anticipation of the more stringent regulations appil-
cable to the eastern part? The answers to all of these questions may affect the formu-
lation of the rule for the definition of the "property" which is relevant to East Cape
May's claim that its property has been deprived of all viable economic uses.
Id. at 128-29. See also Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding
that it was unnecessary at that time to resolve the question of whether all five sections of the
subdivision, or something less, is the relevant parcel for a taking analysis). The Tabb Lakes
court does make clear though that "[t]he quantum of land to be considered is not each individual
lot containing wetlands or even the combined area of wetlands." Id. at 802.
91. Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. at 318-319.
[Vol. 52:2
THE LAW OF TAKING ELSEWHERE
law9 2 will refine our thinking with respect to this aspect of taking questions and
thus contribute to fairer outcomes overall.93
IV. SOME OrHER CONSIDERATIONS IN A TAKING ANALYSIS
Though not always specifically alluded to when taking cases are decided, there
are a number of what are characterized here as "other considerations" that seem to
color judicial thinking and the outcome of particular cases. The first of these is
whether the challenge is a "facial" or an "as applied" challenge. 4 It is simply a
fact that courts are more skeptical of, and less likely to sustain, facial challenges.
That does not mean they never succeed--they sometimes do,95 but the burden on
92. A recent case, District Intown Properties Limited Partnership v District of Columbia,
No. 98-7209 (1999), 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32701 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 1999), underscores this
point. Here the appeals court sustained the lower court's holding that there was no taking. Both
courts purported to frame the taking question by looking at the whole parcel, but in defining that
parcel the D.C. Circuit noted that an original tract (including an apartment house) had been
acquired in 1961. They pointed out that no effort to subdivide that tract had occurred until 1988
(more than 25 years later) and that the subdivided lots were fully contiguous. They examined
the extent to which the restricted lots benefited the developed lot, and finally, they pointed out
that the owners (1961) "primary" investment-backed expectations were not diminished by present
regulations which fully contemplated continuation of the apartment house use. Moreover, at the
time the original parcel was purchased, precursors of the present regulations were in place. In
sum, after a lengthy, site specific inquiry, examining many of the questions the Clampit" and
East Cape May cases suggested be examined, the whole parcel in this case was fairly defined.
and this resulted in a finding that there was no taking.
93. Some scholars are more pessimistic with respect to our ability to define the denominator
parcel; they see the need and agree that it must be done in each taking case but feel that the
courts have been part of the problem, not part of the solution. See, e.g., Raymond R. Coletta,
The Measuring Stick of Regulatory Takings: A Biological and Cultural Analysis, I U. PA. J.
CoNsr. L. 20 (1998). Coletta concludes by noting:
The economics of diminution demand a clear measuring stick. Without a work-
able and consistent definition of "relevant parcel," the diminution calculus becomes
merely a tool for enterprising judges to manipulate decisions toward their own juris-
prudential leanings. Courts have failed to clearly delineate, or even reach general
consensus about, the unit of property against which economic impact is to be mea-
sured for regulatory takings purposes. Seven decades of discourse have produced a
wealth of cases and provides little more than individualized position papers on amyriad
of possible alternatives. Lack of direction by, and misdirection within, the Supreme
Court has compounded the problem by creating a climate of confusion and a general
lack of accountability.
Id. at 83.
94. Other scholars have commented on the distinction between facial and as applied chal-
lenges to governmental regulation. See Peterson, Part 1, supra note 13, at 1360-62; Peterson.
Part II, supra note 13, at 120-23; Michael C. Doff, Facial Challenges to State and Federal
Statutes, 46 STAN. L. R-v. 235 (1994).
95. See, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (sustaining as a taking a facial challenge
brought by potential heirs of Native American lands to an act of Congress that would have cut
off the transfer of small parcels of such lands, returning same to the tribe); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (sustaining a facial challenge brought by building
owner to statute authorizing Teleprompter to place equipment on the building-held, physical
occupation is a taking); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (sustaining
a facial challenge brought by outdoor advertising companies to a billboard ordinance that barred
most non-commercial signs-held, invalid on First Amendment grounds).
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the plaintiff is always more difficult. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis,9 6 the United States Supreme Court, after a lengthy discussion dis-
tinguishing facial taking challenges from "as applied challenges,"'97 put it most
succinctly: "Petitioners thus face an uphill battle in making a facial attack on the
Act as a taking." 98 Perhaps the most frequently cited Supreme Court case address-
ing these issues is Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n.99 In
reversing a lower court holding that had found a taking on the basis of a facial
challenge to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Justice
Marshall (speaking for a Court that was unanimous on this point) noted: "[T]he
court below ignored this Court's oft-repeated admonition that the constitutionality
of statutes ought not to be decided except in an actual factual setting that makes
such a decision necessary." 100 After citing a number of supportive Supreme Court
cases, the Hodel Court elaborated its reasoning:
These "ad hoc factual inquiries" must be conducted with respect to specific prop-
erty, and the particular estimates of economic impact and ultimate valuation rel-
evant in the unique circumstances.
Because appellees' taking claim arose in the context of a facial challenge, it
presented no concrete controversy concerning either application of the Act to
particular surface mining operations or its effect on specific parcels of land. Thus,
the only issue properly before the District Court and, in turn, this Court, is whether
the 'mere enactment' of the Surface Mining Act constitutes a taking. 101
Beyond the obvious benefits of placing particularized facts before a court, "as
applied" taking challenges almost always provide a record--the actions of the prop-
erty owner, the responses of the regulating body, the regulator's interpretations of
the pertinent statutes and/or regulations, and the sequencing and timing of events.
All of these facts will be before a court. Having this information narrows and
96. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
97. Id. at 493-96. In its discussion the Keystone Court cited a number of other cases on point.
See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (reject-
ing a facial challenge to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (rejecting a facial challenge to a zoning ordinance); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). In sustaining the plaintiffs' "as applied" taking
challenge in Kaiser Aetna, Justice Rehaquist commented on the utility and the necessity of
individual fact-based inquiries when dealing with taking questions; he noted that:
mhis Court has generally "been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons." Rather, it has examined the "taking" question by engaging in
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several factors-such as the
economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action-that have particular sig-
nificance.
Id. at 175 (citation omitted) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978)). These factors and particularized injuries can seldom be addressed in broad facial
challenges to regulatory measures.
98. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 495.
99. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
100. Id. at 294-95.
101. hd at 295.
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sharpens the taking question; it facilitates the judicial determination of whether
(even in the particularized setting) a taking has occurred. Moreover, when an "as
applied" taking is found, a court and the regulating body are both aware that the
larger legislatively fashioned regulatory framework remains intact. The inherent
tensions between coordinate branches of government will have been kept at the
lowest possible level. This is not to suggest that "as applied" taking challenges are
easy or are likely to succeed--that would overstate the point being made. All
taking challenges are difficult, the burdens on plaintiffs are considerable, but it is
fair to say that "as applied" challenges have a better chance of success than facial
challenges.
The second of the "other considerations" that should be addressed involves
differentiating between the wide range of police power justifications for regula-
tory controls, i.e., recognizing that there is a hierarchy of health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare considerations that underlie regulatory measures. 102 Though excep-
tions can no doubt be found, it seems generally corect to note that courts, when
called upon to resolve taking questions (when they are engaged in balancing pub-
lic and private interests), are less likely to find a taking in situations where the
challenged regulation would avoid a harm, or where the risk potential is great.
Conversely, when the harm and/or risk potential is low a challenged regulation
(particularly if stringent) may more readily be found to be a taking. Put another
way, when a challenged regulation addresses values that are high on the hierarchy
of public values a taking is less likely to be found; and again, the converse is
true-a taking will more readily be found when stringent regulations address pub-
lic values of lower priority.
102. Though not often explicitly discussed, the case by case balancing test that courts engage
in to decide a taking case implicitly recognizes that not all harms (not all public values) are of
equal weight. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), where the Court notes
that- "Although no precise rule determines when property has been taken, the question necessar-
ily requires a weighing of private and public interests." Id. at 260-61 (citation omitted). In
Gilbert v. State, 266 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1990), the court found ther was not a taking, but refcrec-
ing Agins, went on to conjecture whether "there is a hierarchy of public purposes such that
certain public safety programs might be treated differently from other legitimate regulatory a.-
tivities." Id at 904 n.14. In Countryman v. Schmin, 673 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1998). the
plaintiff prevailed on non-taking grounds, but in its discussion the court noted: "[A]esthetic
factors ... rate well down in the hierarchy of public purposes." Id at 527 (quoting Rochester
Tel. Corp. v. Village of Fairport, 84 A.D.2d 455, 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). There is also
scholarly comment very much on point. See Charles L Siemon, Who Owns Cross Creek?, 5 J.
LAN UsE & Ehv-n. L. 323 (1990). Siemon's principle 3 notes: "The extent to which the police
power may limit private use of private property without going 'too far' varies according to the
significance of the public purpose to which the regulation is directed." l. at 362 (emphasis
omitted). He goes on: "It appears from reading the case law that the willingness of the courts to
find that a regulation has gone 'too far' declines as the importance of the purpose increases." Id.
Finally, he observes:
Within the range of valid public purposes are purposes which are more signifi-
cant and purposes which are less significant, and the standard of how far is "too far"
varies according to the significance of the purpose involved. At one end of the spec-
mum are public health purposes involving life-threatening diseases or other hazards-
"matters of necessity." At the other end are purposes that reflect little more than a
community preference for a particular quality-of-life factor...
lI at 364.
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Perhaps the most articulate judicial recognition of this hierarchy of police
power interests is found in the California Court of Appeal's disposition of the re-
manded (from the United States Supreme Court) First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles case.103 After laying out the facts
and the unique procedural posture of the case, the court noted:
If there is a hierarchy of interests the police power serves--and both logic
and prior cases suggest there is-then the preservation of life must rank at the
top. Zoning restrictions seldom serve public interests so far up on the scale.
More often these laws guard against things like "premature urbanization" or "pre-
serve open spaces" or contribute to orderly development and the mitigation of
environmental impacts. When land use regulations seek to advance what are
deemed lesser interests such as aesthetic values of the community they frequently
are outweighed by constitutional property rights. 104
The court went on to note:
The zoning regulation challenged in the instant case involves this highest of
public interests .... [Ilts avowed purpose is to prevent the loss of lives in future
floods....
We need not address the ultimate question-is the public interest at stake in
this case so paramount that it would justify a law which prohibited any future
occupancy or use of appellant's land.... [The zoning limitation in the instant
case [though stringent] is nowhere near as Draconian. 105
Finally on this point, it seems appropriate to observe that the concept of a
hierarchy of police power interests more accurately explains some early United
States Supreme Court cases, for example, Hadacheck v. Sebastian,10 6 Miller v.
Schoene,10 7 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,108 that some scholars had argued
stood for the proposition that there was an unwritten nuisance exception to the
taking clause. Other scholars had long doubted that any such exception ever ex-
isted, and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal CouncilI09 seems to bear out the latter
view. But how to explain the above cited, and similar, cases? Put quite simply,
each represents a setting or situation in which the risk factor is high, and the dan-
ger potential is great; in other words, the public interest value being served is high
in the hierarchy of police power interests. It is so high in each of these cases, that
the police power regulation that was being challenged (though stringent) was sus-
tained. There was no taking, not because of any nuisance exception to the Taking
Clause, but because the hierarchy principle has implicitly and sometimes explic-
itly operated for a very long time.
The last of the "other considerations" that affects taking analyses involves the
sequencing and timing of events which underlie conflicts between what a property
103. 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Ct. App. 1989).
104. Ie at 904 (citations omitted).
105. Id. A complete reading of the court's analysis on the hierarchy of police power interests,
including its case and law review citations, is instructive.
106. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
107. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
108. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
109. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See in particular Justice Scalia's discussion of the three previ-
ously cited cases and the so-called nuisance exception at 1022-24.
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owner wants to do with his land and a regulation that would block that undertak-
ing, a regulation the property owner would characterize as a taking. 110 Whether a
court couches its analysis in an examination of the reasonableness of the property
owner's (investment-backed) expectation111 or characterizes the property owner's
right as "vested, ' 112 make no mistake, it is the timing and sequencing of the re-
spective actions of property owner and government that are being focused upon. A
recent federal court case that spoke to these issues was Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States.113 In finding a regulatory taking the court pointed out that:
It is important to note that Loveladies purchased the property with the intent
to develop it long before these particular state and federal regulatory programs
came into effect. Furthermore, the state did not include in its original conditions
for development of the property any restrictions on the filling of the 12.5 acres at
issue here. The fill restrictions did not arise until long after the development
project was undertaken. 114
110. At a more abstract level, the relationship between property rights and the time con-
tinuum was explored in Synposium: une, Property Rights, and the Common Law, 64 WAsH. U.
L.Q. 661 (1986). The lead article in the Symposium that the other papers responded to was
authored by a scholar familiar to many who examine taking issues. See Richard A. Epstein, Past
and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASIL U. LQ. 667 (1986).
111. See William C. Leigh & Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Governmental Zoning Practices
and the Supreme Court's New Takings Clause Formulation: Thming, Value, and RJ.B.E. [Rea-
sonable Investment Backed Expectations], 1993 BYU L REv. 827 (1993). These authors assert
(and most scholars agree) that the "[Miarket value [of land] is driven by land use laws to a very
material extent." Id. at 842. It follows then that the reasonableness of an investment-backed
expectation must turn on the timing of events. When was the land in question purchased? When
were the controls that now block development put in place? If a property owner purchases land
with an eye to development before a present set of land use controls is put in place, reasonable
development proposals, predicated on whatever (presumably more limited) controls existed at
the time of purchase, should be realizable; subsequently enacted controls that would block de-
velopment are more readily open to taking challenge. In the scenario outlined, as long as the
property owner's development proposals are reasonable, his/her expectations that they can be
(will be) realized are also reasonable. Alternatively, a property owner who purchases land after
stringent (but otherwise sustainable) land use controls are in place--controls which shaped the
purchase price of the land and delineated a range of development options-will find a taking
argument more difficult to sustain when, and if, a development proposal is submitted and re-
jected because it exceeds the parameters of the controls in place. The fact that the property
owner's development proposals on their face or in other settings might be deemed reasonable, or
that the proposed development is more economically advantageous to the property owner is
irrelevant. In the scenario outlined, the property owner can have no realistic expectation that his
or her vision for development can be (will be) realized-he or she was on notice to the contrary;
the reasonableness of expectation essential to finding a taking simply does not exist. See also
supra Part mI.C.
112. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38
Wm. & MAw L. R v. 995 (1997). Kmiec's discussion, which attempts to weave taking theories
(including the 'reasonable investment backed expectations' factor), vested rights theories, and
coming to the harm principles into a workable whole, is insightful See id. at 1022-26. A finding
that aproperty owner's right has 'vested' in effect finesses the taking question, but has the same
practical effect as a finding that the regulation being challenged effects a taking-the property
owner gets to go forward on the basis of the pre-existing regulatory framework. See generally,
Orlando E. Delogu, Land Use and Vested Rights: Mixed Law & Policy Issues, 41 L.A i UsE LAw
& ZONNG DIGEsT, Jan. 1989, at 3; John J. Delaney & Emily J. Vaias, Recognizing Vested Devel-
opment Rights as Protected Property in Fifth Amendment Due Process and Takings Claims, 49
WASH. UJ. URB. & Comp. L. 27 (1996).
113. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
114. Id. at 1183.
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At another point in its opinion, the Loveladies court, focusing on the opposite
circumstance, quite correctly stated:
In legal terms, the owner who bought with knowledge of the restraint could
be said to have no reliance interest, or to have assumed the risk of any economic
loss. In economic terms, it could be said that the market had already discounted
for the restraint, so that a purchaser could not show a loss in his investment at-
tributable to it.115
In other words, where this is the case, a taking would not readily be found. In this
same vein, the holding of the court in Ciampitti v. United States1 16 is pertinent; on
these timing issues the court found there was no taking in part because, "Ciampitti
had knowledge of the difficulty attendant upon developing wetlands well before
any of the purchases at issue."' 117 Finally on this point, it should be pointed out
that the timing and sequencing of events was an important factor in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council. Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, recounts the
history of Lucas's dealings with the property: Lucas purchased the lots at issue in
the litigation in 1986. Justice Scalia also recounts South Carolina's history of
coastal zone regulation, including the dates of passage of pertinent acts; he con-
cludes by noting:
No portion of the lots, which were located approximately 300 feet from the beach,
qualified as a "critical area" under the 1977 Act; accordingly, at the time Lucas
acquired these parcels, he was not legally obliged to obtain a permit from the
Council in advance of any development activity. His intention with respect to the
lots was to do what the owners of the immediately adjacent parcels had already
done: erect single-family residences. He commissioned architectural drawings
for this purpose.
The Beachfront Management Act [enacted in 1988] brought Lucas's plans
to an abrupt end. 118
Though this case ultimately turned on other factors, 119 the inferences of the Court
on the points being discussed here seem clear-Lucas's development plans and
expectations were reasonable; had his economic loss been less than total, a taking
might well have been found, as it subsequently was in Loveladies, on the basis of
the factors just outlined.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO GRASP THE FULL RANGE OF FACTORS
AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN REGULATORY TAKING CASES
As suggested in the introductory pages of this Article, the failure to fully un-
derstand the number, variety, range, depth, and interconnected character of the
factors that form a part of most taking analyses seems greatest among those groups
and individuals with extreme views-those who would over-regulate land on one
hand, and property rights absolutists on the other. The former, caught up in the
worthiness of their cause, are inclined to ignore (or minimize the scope of) the
115. Id. at 1177.
116. 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991).
117. Id. at 321. The court's entire discussion of these issues is insightful. See id. at 321-22.
118. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008 (1992).
119. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
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Fifth Amendment's taking clause;12 0 the latter would characterize almost any regu-
lation as a regulatory taking requiring the payment of just compensation. Both
groups are, of course, wrong, and if their respective pronouncements produced
little more than back and forth sniping at one another, the situation would be an-
noying, but bearable. But that is not all we have to contend with. The fact of the
matter is that both groups, to a degree disproportionate to their numbers, and in
ways that ignore more accurate and correct taking principles, have been able to
influence the larger public debate. On one hand, we are beset with overzealous
regulatory proposals, 121 which then must be seriously discussed and hopefully
120. An unfortunate example of this was evidenced at a very high level of Maine's regulatory
and legal establishment shortly after the Lucas decision was handed down. The Natural Re-
sources Policy Division of the State Planning Office pulled together a publication, In the Wake
of Lucas: A Compilation of Articles and Analysis Concerning the Case and the Takings Issue.
The compilation included a memorandum from the Department of Attorney General directed to
all Environmental and Natural Resources Agencies. Jeff Pidot, Deputy Attorney General State
of Maine, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Memorandum to Environmental and Natu-
ral Resources Agencies, July 31, 1992, reprinted in IN anm WAxE op LucAs: A Comn.cnoN oF
A mcm a D nANAysis CoNc iim CASE An m TA os Ls at 38 (Natural Resources
Policy Division, State Planning Office, Aug. 1992). It was prepared by a Deputy Attorney
General, and obviously received wide distribution by its inclusion in the above-noted publica-
tion. See id. At one point the author of the Memorandum says:
It is perhaps more important to recognize what the Lucas Court did not do. It did
not waiver from the core rule that a regulatory taking ordinarily requires a deprivation
of all economically valuable uses of land. On at least this one principle, all the jus-
tices appear to be satisfied.
Id. at 41. That's simply incorrect; all the justices did not agree that in order to find a regulatory
taking the landowner must be deprived of all economic value. Justice Scalia makes that point
quite clear. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7, 1019 n.8. The
Attorney General's memorandum concludes: "Accordingly, it would be incorrect to read Lucas
as suggesting that the scope of statutory authority, vested in state agencies to regulate the uses of
land, has been seriously undermined." Id. In the broadest sense the statement is probably true,
but its tone and the tone of the whole memo is unmistakable-Lucas and other recent United
States Supreme Court cases are no big deal: it's business as usual in Maine. But Lucas and the
line of cases of which it is a part cannot be, and should not have been, dismissed so cavalierly.
This memo, from this source, sent the wrong signals with respect to the law of taking to regula-
tors, planners, and land use lawyers throughout Maine, and we are all paying the price-
emboldened regulatory proposals that have spawned property rights legislation year after year.
121. Beyond the Maine examples already cited, supra note 16, the Portland Preis Herald
reported a proposal tendered to the Town of Scarborough's Open Spzce Committee to preserve
open space by imposing a $200,000 per lot impact fee. See David Connerty- Martin, Scarborough
Struggles to Save Space, POrtLAn PRs HESS u, Dec. 6, 1999, at lB. Another example (actu-
ally in place) is laid out in the Maine Land Use Regulatory Commission's (LURC) zoning and
development controls for unorganized areas. Three categories of lakes (and surrounding land
areas) are subject to stringent control. Management class six consists of remote ponds; these
waterbodies are mostly small, are presently undeveloped and difficult to access, and possess a
cold-water fishery--all development except timber harvesting is barred within one-half mile of
the shoreline of such lakes (there are 176 such waterbodies in Maine). Management class one
lakes are larger-, they are also undeveloped and difficult to access (but have no unique cold-
water fishery)-all development except timber harvesting is barred within one-quarter mile of
the shoreline of such lakes (there are 29 such waterbodies in Maine). Management class two
lakes are larger still; they are accessible and there is some existing development; from a fishery
and aesthetic viewpoint these lakes, if not unique, are nonetheless very attractive--development
is limited to timber harvesting and one unit per mile of shoreline (there are 36 such waterbodies
in Maine). In the aggregate, 241 waterbodies encompassing approximately 16% of the surface
20001
350 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:2
modified to fit within the parameters of taking law. These proposals have in turn
provoked overly simplistic legislative efforts to define a taking; 122 these legisla-
tive proposals have also engendered serious debate-debate which at least for now
has led to the defeat (in Maine and at the national level) of these too narrow and
unwise efforts to define a taking.123 But engineering the defeat of unwise taking
legislation is a lose-lose undertaking. It is costly in time and money. It may not
indefinitely succeed. It deflects public officials from the more pressing business
of enforcing and fine-tuning a wide array of reasonable and necessary regulations.
It suggests to a broader public that property rights absolutists may have a point-
waters under LURC jurisdiction (and the respective surrounding land areas) are presently sub-
ject to these varying degrees of regulatory stringency. Is it any wonder that the private property
owners of these lands are concerned? See CoMmzsvELAND USE PLAN, Appendix C (Dep't of
Conservation, Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 1997). Finally in the Natural Resources
Council (NRC) of Maine's publication, Sprawlstoppers, the NRC urges Maine towns to delin-
eate growth and non-growth areas; the latter would encompass a major portion of the buildable
land in most suburban and rural towns. See SPRAwLLsPpms: STmAraGis -to HEL' Papnivr DE-
vonEmNr SPRAwL m MAnwE Co muimrs (Natural Resources Council of Maine). In the latter
areas, the NRC ideally would "prohibit subdivisions," id. at 13; prohibit so-called "non-essen-
tial commercial development," id.; establish a low allowable density of development, e.g., "one
unit per ten acres," id, at 14; require that the majority of land be dedicated to open space, e.g.,
"75% of developable land," id.; impose large road frontage requirements on many existing roads,
e.g., greater than 1000 feet, see id. at 17; limit the number of building permits issued annually in
non-growth areas to a low percentage (10% is recommended) of the total number of building
permits issued townwide-thus, if as many as 100 permits were issued annually, only 10 would
be available for any and all development in what might well be the largest physical land area
(portion) of the town, see id. at 13; and finally, where subdividing in rural areas is allowed, NRC
would "limit the number of lots which can be sold in any rural subdivision within a year, e.g.,
two," id at 16. None of these proposed regulatory limitations is tied to any inherent limitations
on the land (soils, steep slope, water table, flood plain or storm surge areas, etc.); they are not
tied to (or required to be justified by) infrastructure limitations; they are intended to exclude all,
or almost all, development in delineated non-growth areas of most Maine towns-we're talking
literally about millions of acres of land. If these proposals were adopted, many would argue that
they are a facial taking; they would almost certainly seem vulnerable (individually and collec-
tively) to "as applied" taking challenges. Moreover, proposals of the type outlined here and in
note 16, supra, (even if offered only for discussion purposes) are like a red flag to a bull-
property rights advocates are both threatened and angry; their response-they would shore up
the institution of property by legislation that would define such proposals (if adopted) as a tak-
ing. See generally, Orlando E. Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must End:
Suggestions for Legislative and Judicial Responses, 32 ME. L. Rev. 29 (1980).
122. See supra notes 17, 19. The usual method seeks to define a taking utilizing a one-
dimensional, diminution in value, approach. The legislative definitions differ only in the degree
of diminution that would define a taking; most federal proposals are in the 20-25% range, though
at least one focusing on wetlands and endangered species habitat would allow up to a 50%
diminution in value before compensation payments to the landowner (for a taking) would be
required. See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 2, at 162 n.10. Maine's L.D. 1217 in the 117th
Legislature (not adopted) defined a taking as a 50% reduction from preregulation fair market
value. See An Act to Protect Constitutional Property Rights and to Provide Just Compensation,
L.D. 1217 (117th Legis. 1995). At least one legislative proposal, L.D. 2121 in the 119th Legis-
lature, would require compensation for any diminution in value growing out of state or local
government regulation. See An Act Regarding Regulations and Compensation to Property Own-
ers, L.D. 2121 (119th Legis. 1999).
123. See supra note 19; see also Glenn P. Sugameli, "Takings" Bills Threaten People, Prop-
erty, Zoning, and the Environment, 31 URB. LAW. 177 (1999).
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that there may be a problem---that a better piece of taking legislation could per-
haps be drafted and should perhaps be adopted.
But a better piece of taking legislation is not out there somewhere waiting to
be discovered. There are too many variables, too many unique pieces of land, and
unique development circumstances. That is why a case by case approach (not
legislation) is needed to determine whether in a particular setting a taking has
occurred. 12 4 The suggestion that well over 100 years of taking case law (literally
thousands of cases) that have sought to balance the array of complex factors that
go into a taking analysis can be reduced to a one-size-fits-all legislative definition
of a taking is a myth; if it were possible, we would have done it long ago. But it is
a beguiling myth, a myth that accords with our "rule of law" sensibilities. And
sadly, it is a myth that regulatory zealots keep alive by continuing to proffer regu-
latory proposals that shock many, particularly rural landowners-proposals that
under the classic Pennsylvania Coal 12 5 formulation go "too far."126
Where it will all end is difficult to predict, but it seems useful to lay out two
scenarios: one is more hopeful in the meshing of property rights and police power
within a constitutional and democratic system, the other is more dire in its conse-
quences. The more hopeful scenario is premised first on a broader knowledge and
acceptance of taking law as it really is, circa 2000, by all units of government in
Maine (and in other states). Whether we like the law of taking as it has evolved is
irrelevant. The last twenty-five years of United States Supreme Court case law is
there, and it is not going away. We must accept what is widely recognized-that
124. The assumption here is that taking disputes may find resolution by gaining (more or less
readily) access to our court system; in fact, in many jurisdictions this access is a time consuming
and an extraordinarily difficult process. Those who would overregulate when operating in a
legislative forum have found considerable success in turning back (or at least delaying) taking
challenges in judicial forums by interposing a wide array of what are often referred to as pruden-
tial doctrines-standing, abstention, finality, exhaustion, ripeness, mootness, the argued avail-
ability of state remedies when in federal court, etc. Courts. aware of separation of powers
principles and dictum that would reach constitutional questions later rather than sooner, am
often reluctant to examine legislative or quasi-legislative regulatory judgments at all, and cer-
tainly not prematurely. Taking challenges then, are not seen (by governmental defendants or by
courts) as an opportunity for speedy resolution of the merits of the case, but instead are turned
into a war of attrition, in a setting where the regulators have a lot of staying power. Though
these issues are largely beyond the scope of this Article, one observation is pertinent. To the
extent that these litigation tactics succeed, the eventual passage of taking legislation is made
even more likely; by arguably over-regulating on one hand, and all but foreclosing judicial
resolution of taking challenges on the other, we not only give credibility to property rights advo-
cates, but we seemingly make property rights legislation necessary. See. e.g.. John J. Delaney &
Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the "Ripeness Mess"? A Callfor Reform So Takings
Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 URs. LAw. 195 (1999). This latter article con-
tains, in appendix, the full testimony of Professor Daniel Mandelker to a subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 1534, a 1997 bill before the United States Congress de-
signed to remove ripeness (and other) barriers to plaintiffs who would raise taking issues in
federal courts. See id. at 254-56. It is interesting and persuasive reading, and one must believe
that if this legislation fails today, it will not fail indefinitely. See also Kathryn E. Kovacs,
Accepting the Relegation of Taking Claims to the State Courts: The Federal Courts'Misgulded
Attempts to Avoid Preclusion under Williamson County, 26 EcoLoGy LQ. 1 (1999).
125. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
126. See supra notes 7, 8 and accompanying text.
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courts in recent years (at every level) have been a little more protective of property
rights than they might have heretofore been. At the same time, they have sustained
without reservation a wide range of essential and necessary police power con-
trols. 127 Neither of these trends is likely to change. Once this is accepted, a softer,
more precise, more sophisticated set of police power controls (controls well within
the parameters of current taking law) can begin to be designed. Such controls need
not be, nor should they be, blunt instruments or heavy-handed. They should be
more scalpel-like in character. They should be tied to real data (soils, slope, popu-
lation levels, traffic volumes, infrastructure capacity) and/or measurable health
and safety risks (storm surge, flood recurrence, waste load characteristics). Such
controls should aim at allowing the fullest range of uses, the highest level of eco-
nomic return, consistent with protecting public interests, not the barest minimum
that may, or may not be, constitutionally sustainable. 12 8 A system of controls
along these lines, controls that fully respect taking principles, will not ward off the
rantings of the most extreme property rights advocates, but such controls will be
respected by, and hold the support of, the broader public; such controls will dimin-
ish the likelihood that taking litigations will be successful and will make the pas-
sage of taking legislation both less necessary and less likely.129
127. This affirmation goes back to the paradigm case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922), wherein the Court noted that: "Government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law ... some values [property rights] are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must
yield to the police power." Id. at 413. Nothing in the recent line of United States Supreme Court
cases compromises these views-indeed they are repeatedly reaffirmed. See supra note 4.
128. See National Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965). In balancing property
rights and police power controls, the court noted: "[W]e must also appreciate the fact that zon-
ing involves governmental restrictions upon a landowner's constitutionally guaranteed right to
use his property, unfettered, except in very specific instances by government restrictions." Id. at
607. The point being made is that property rights (not police power controls) are constitution-
ally protected-controls may well be necessary but they must be justified by some aspect of
public health, safety, or general welfare and should be no more burdensome than necessary. The
question should not be how far can we push a regulatory control, but rather, what is the degree of
control needed to achieve the public interest at risk-regulations should not go beyond this
point.
129. A collateral point beyond the scope of the taking issues examined in this Article should
be noted. The more hopeful scenario outlined may be made even more hopeful (that is, under-
lying public interests may be more fully served) by utilizing a wide range of proactive govern-
ment spending and decision-making powers in a manner that complements the softer, more
precise use of regulation that has been suggested. For example, channeling growth to more
desired locations-minimizing sprawl, may be achieved not simply by regulation limiting do-
velopment in areas where we prefer it not to be, but by locating such facilities as schools, high-
way interchanges and other road improvements, water and sewer lines, etc., in areas where we
want that development to occur. We could reinforce our build/anti-sprawl strategy by channel-
ing housing subsidies to build areas; by repairing and/or improving all existing infrastructure-
type facilities in build areas (sewers, sidewalks, street lighting, parks, etc.); by reducing lot
sizes, utilizing density bonuses, creating incentives for clustering, planned unit developments,
and multi-family housing in build areas. Unlike stringent regulatory controls (designed to mini-
mize development in one part of town), these policy and spending choices by government do not
raise taking questions-they do not tell anyone what they can or cannot do with their property-
they simply make development more attractive in one area of town as opposed to another area.
If pursued fully, such measures reduce the need for stringent regulatory controls-public inter-
est goals are achieved by inducing appropriate behavior, not by prohibiting (in ways that may
raise taking problems) less desired behavior.
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The more dire scenario is easy to lay out. If proponents of regulatory control,
no matter how well-intentioned, continue to press the regulatory envelope, and
continue to ignore Fifth Amendment limitations and taking principles as they have
unfolded over the last twenty-five years, the absolutists (sooner or later) will win.
Courts will more readily respond to taking claims; the passage of taking legisla-
tion becomes not just a possibility, but a likelihood; and the support of the broader
public, a support essential for any regulatory program to succeed, will be lost. And
once the pendulum has swung, it will not be just extreme regulatory proposals and
programs that will be at risk. Many necessary and essential zoning, land use, and
environmental controls that are commonplace today will be watered down or elimi-
nated to ward off taking challenges and/or to keep diminutions in value occasioned
by such controls within whatever new parameter (50%, 30%, 20% reduction in
property value) defines a taking. It will be a field day for the less responsible
developer/property owner, and it may well be some time before a more balanced
view of public interest reasserts itself. We should not, we need not run these risks.
VL CONCLUSION
Debate as to the meaning of the Taking Clause goes back a long time. In
regulatory taking settings, determining when there has been a taking has been made
more difficult by efforts to simplify and explain taking principles by reducing the
question to be decided (does this regulation, in this setting, go "too far"?) to a two
or three factor test intended to produce an easy answer. But courts have not always
agreed on which two or three factors are most significant, and different word for-
mulations (suggesting slightly different meanings) of even those factors generally
accepted as significant can readily be found. That is the problem-inherently com-
plex constitutional principles do not lend themselves to over-simplification. Ve
should stop looking for quick, shorthand, one, two, or three factor tests to deter-
mine whether in a particular setting there has been a taking-it is fruitless and
even counter-productive.
The fact is, as this Article has shown, there are eight, nine, or ten factors,
perhaps more (depending on how one chooses to add them up) that may need to be
put into the balancing calculus to determine whether a particular set of circum-
stances gives rise to a taking. And though all of these factors will not be important
in each taking case, it is almost impossible to predict at the outset which factors
will loom large in a particular setting-, thus, it is important that they all be under-
stood and kept at the ready. Proponents of a more coherent approach to, and a
more coherent body of, taking case law should not shrink from these truths. In
fact, it is only when these underlying realities are recognized that we can see that
past taking cases are not in the total disarray that critics claim13 0 and reasonable
prediction as to the outcome of future taking cases is possible. 13 1 Past cases may
130. See supra note 13.
131. See Peterson, Part II, supra note 13. This, the second of Professor Peterson's excellent
articles analyzing the taking clause, suggests this very predictability. See U at 58-59. After
proceeding exhaustively through a myriad of cases to find a unifying set of principles that would
explain taking cases, she concluded that:
Frhere is a pattern to the Court's takings decisions. That pattern is not atributable to
the announced doctrine, [the definitional label the case may bear] but rather to the
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not square up with this two-factor, or that three-factor formula, but the outcome
may well have been a reasonable one, and one that could readily be reconciled
with the larger multi-factor analytic framework laid out here. And if reasonable-
ness and the balancing of public and private interests remain the touchstone of
future taking cases, this larger analytic framework will allow a high degree of
predictability as to outcome in such cases.
Those with an agenda can act as if taking law is largely unpredictable, and/or
incapable of precise definition or delineation-but that is not true. Taking law
may not lend itself to off-hand, facile, or tautological definition. But once one
understands the full range of factors and other considerations at work in a taking
analysis, and as important, once one has all of the facts (or as many as possible)
with respect to a particular regulation in a particular setting, a reasonably accurate
determination can be made as to whether there is a taking in that setting. The
definition of a taking, then, is like Justice Stewart's definition of pornography-
difficult to formulate in so many words, but as he said, "I know it when I see it."'132
So too with a taking-give me the regulation, give me the facts, give me a setting,
a timeframe, and a context-I'll know it [a taking] when I see it. And so too will
the courts and the larger public.
Finally, learning to live within the parameters of today's more precisely de-
fined law of taking is not something we need fear. The sky will not fall. The
historic balances between public interests and private property rights have not be-
come dangerously unbalanced as a result of recent case law, and no such unbalanc-
ing is likely in the immediate future. On the contrary, understanding the law of
taking, and then proceeding along the more hopeful lines suggested here is the
only course that in the long-run allows public interests to really be protected; at the
same time it is a course that provides constitutional legitimacy to government and
constitutional protection to the governed.
fact that the Justices evidently are deciding these cases according to their sense of
when it is fair [reasonable] for the government to take something of economic value
from a private party without paying for it. By following their moral intuitions, [that
is, by fairly and reasonably balancing competing public and private interests] they
have produced results that can be explained in a coherent [and, one might add, a
predictable] manner.
Id. at 161-62.
132. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). This analogy was
made more than a decade ago. See Siemon, supra note 102 at 363.
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